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COLORADO V. NEW MEXICO II: JUDICIAL RESTRIMNT
IN THE EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF

INTERSTATE WATERS*
INTRODUCTION

In Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado II), 1 the United States Supreme
Court clarified the evidentiary standard of review used pursuant to the
doctrine of equitable apportionment in original jurisdiction actions involving the allocation of interstate waters. 2 Because the Court uncharacteristically disregarded the Special Master's report, the case is
noteworthy and marks the sole instance in which the Court has totally
rejected the Special Master's findings in an equitable apportionment ac3
tion involving interstate waters.
This comment will review the development of the doctrine of equitable apportionment prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado
II. The legal principles and public policy considerations underlying the
majority and dissenting opinions will then be examined. Finally, this
comment will conclude that the "clear and convincing evidence" standard is inappropriate for equitable apportionment actions involving interstate water disputes. Instead, the Supreme Court should employ the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard because maintenance of the
"status quo between states" 4 should give way to the paramount concern
for the beneficial use of a scarce natural resource.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF

EQUITABLE

APPORTIONMENT

The doctrine of equitable apportionment is the federal common law
governing the Supreme Court's determination of interstate water
rights. 5 The doctrine is grounded in the federal Constitution's provi* The author would like to express his gratitude to Mr. Robert F. Welborn of
Welborn, Dufford, Brown & Tooley, Denver, Colorado, for his invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this case comment. Of course, all errors, inconsistencies, and opinions
expressed are this author's responsibility.
1. 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984). In Colorado v. New Mexico, 104 S.Ct. 2433 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court re-examined the findings of a Special Master after remanding the original action, Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), for additional findings. To avoid the possibility of any confusion, the Court's 1982 decision in Colorado v.
New Mexico will be cited as ColoradoI, while the Court's 1984 decision in Colorado v. New
Mexico will be cited as ColoradoII.
2. Colorado 1I, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-42.
3. See NewJersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 996 (1954); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 601, 604, 606, 608, 620-21 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343
(1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); see also Mississippi v. Arkansas,
415 U.S. 289, 297 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (findings of Master entitled to respect,
especially where the credibility of witnesses is significant); 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4054 (1985) (findings of Special Master
should be deemed presumptively correct).
4. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 195 (O'Connor, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
5. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907); see also U.S. CONST., art. III, cls. I & 2.
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sion for states' equal rights. 6
In Kansas v. Colorado,7 the Supreme Court set out the doctrine of
equitable apportionment for the first time, albeit not in those exact
words. 8 In that case, Kansas had brought an original action to restrain
Colorado appropriators from diverting water from the Arkansas River.9
Kansas contended that it had a right to the natural and customary flow
of the river l ° under the natural flow theory of the riparian doctrine"
because it was a downstream state on an interstate river. Conversely,
Colorado argued it had a sovereign right to retain the river's entire flow
for its own benefit, regardless of any injury such appropriation might
cause downstream users.1 2 The Court rejected both contentions 13 and
concluded that its decision was to be guided by the particular exigencies
of the case, 14 the rules of equity, 15 and a balancing of both states' interests. 16 After reviewing the evidence presented by both states, 17 the
Court held that although diversions in Colorado had caused some perceptible injury,' 8 the detriment was insubstantial in light of the great
benefit such diversions afforded to Colorado. 19
The role of local water law in equitable apportionment actions was
first addressed by the Court in Wyoming v. Colorado.20 Wyoming brought
(constitutional grant of original jurisdiction over controversies between states); see generally
2 C. CORKER, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 132.1 (1967) (overview of the foundations of
equitable apportionment); Kelly, Rationing the Rivers: A Decade of Interstate Waters and Interstate Commerce in the Supreme Court, 14 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 12 (1941) (concise summary of
the principles of equitable apportionment).
6. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 97.
7. 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Kansas v. Colorado is reviewed in Bannister, Interstate Rights
in InterstateStreams in the Arid West: Kansas v. Colorado and Wyoming v. Colorado, 36 HAtv.
L. REV. 960 (1923) and in Friedrich, The Settlement of Disputes Between States Concerning Rights
to the Waters ofInterstate Streams, 32 IOWA L. REv. 244 (1947).
8. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117. The Court spoke of Kansas' right to petition
for an "equitable division" of the waters of the Arkansas River if its citizens were being
substantially injured by the upstream appropriations of Colorado users. Id
9. Id at 46.
10. Id at 58-60.
11. There are two basic doctrines governing water rights: the riparian doctrine, recognized largely by states east of the hundredth meridian and the doctrine of prior appropriation, recognized in most of the western states.
The riparian doctrine has two distinct theories of water use: the natural flow theory
and the reasonable use theory. Under the former, riparian landowners may use the waters
of a stream so long as that use does not affect either the quantity or quality of the streamflow. The reasonable use theory entitles riparians to the reasonable use of the streamflow
for normal consumptive purposes and the discharge of wastes.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, water rights may be acquired by diverting
water and using it for a beneficial purpose. The rule of priority determines the relative
rights of appropriators, whose appropriations are ranked in the order of their seniority. 1
W. HUTrcINs, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 16, 18, 19 (1967).
1.2. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 98. See also Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,
466 (1921) (where Colorado again unsuccessfully used this argument).
13. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 98-105.
14. Id at 48.
15. Id at 98.
16. Id at 117.
17. Id at 105-17.
18. Id. at 117.
19. Id. at 114.
20. 259 U.S. 419 (1922). Wyoming v. Colorado is discussed in CoLoaDo WATER
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suit to enjoin a proposed diversion from the Laramie River by Colorado
users. 2 1 Both Wyoming and Colorado followed the doctrine of prior
appropriation.2 2 After reviewing the evidence presented, the Court
concluded that the doctrine of prior appropriation controlled because it
furnished the only just and reasonable means of resolving an interstate
23
water dispute between two appropriation states.
The Court's final decree, however, evinced a significant departure
from the doctrine's "priority principle." '24 Recognizing the importance
of conservation in promoting water's paramount beneficial use, the
Court concluded that the doctrine of equitable apportionment imposed
upon each state a duty to exercise its rights in a manner reasonably calculated to conserve the "common supply."'25 Therefore, in order to
promote conservation of the common supply, the Court granted junior
Colorado appropriators priority over senior Wyoming users for all years
during which the streamflow falls below the judicially-established "fairly
26
constant and dependable" flow.
In Connecticut v. Massachusetts,2 7 the Court first addressed an interstate water dispute between contending riparian states. 28 Connecticut
sought to prohibit the diversion of water to the Boston metropolitan
area from two tributaries of the Connecticut River.2 9 The Court denied
the injunction, holding that Connecticut had failed to show by "clear
and convincing evidence" that the threatened injury was of a "serious
magnitude."' 30 Further, the Court found that because water is essential
for human consumption and other domestic uses, equity could not abide
31
the granting of an injunction.
In response to Connecticut's contention that because both states
were riparian doctrine states the riparian doctrine's natural flow theory
should control the Court's determination,3 2 the Court reiterated the eq33
uitable apportionment principles first announced in Kansas v. Colorado:
that local water law was merely a persuasive consideration;3 4 that each
CONSERVATION BOARD, LARAMIE RIVER LITIGATION (1950); Carman, Sovereign Rights and Re-

lations in the Control and Use of American Waters, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 266 (1930); and Wehrli,
Decrees in Interstate Water Suits, 1 Wyo. L.J. 13 (1946).
21. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 456.
22. Id. at 467, 470.
23. Id at 470.
24. See supra text accompanying note 11.
25. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 484.
26. Id at 480.
27. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). Connecticut v. Massachusetts is discussed in Stephenson,
Interstate Rights to the Waters of the Connecticut River: Issues Raised by the Proposed Northfield

Diversion, 4 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 641 (1982) and Recent ImportantDecisions, 29 MicH.L. REv.
1067, 1104 (1931).
28. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 662.
29. Id
30. Id. at 669. This evidentiary standard first appeared in Missouri v. Illinois, 200
U.S. 496, 521 (1906), where Justice Holmes stated that "[b]efore this court will intervene,
the case should be of serious magnitude, dearly and fully proved.
31. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 673.
32. Id at 669-70.
33. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
34. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 670.
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determination involved consideration of the existing exigencies;3 5 and
that all relevant facts should be considered in determining what consti36
tutes a just apportionment of disputed interstate waters.
37
In the next equitable apportionment case, Washington v. Oregon,
the state of Washington alleged that upstream appropriators in Oregon
wrongfully diverted an excessive amount of water from a Walla Walla
River tributary, and requested an equitable apportionment of the
river. 38 The Special Master appointed by the Court found no "clear and
convincing evidence" that the upstream appropriators had seriously impaired the rights of Washington water users.3 9 The Court agreed with
40
the Special Master's findings and dismissed Washington's complaint.
In 1943, the Court once again addressed an interstate water rights
dispute involving Colorado and Kansas. 4 ' On this occasion, however,
Colorado brought the original action, seeking to enjoin Kansas and one
of its citizens from the further prosecution of suits which attempted to
restrain Colorado users from appropriating water from the Arkansas
River. 4 2 Kansas cross-claimed, alleging that Colorado had substantially
increased the volume of diversions to the detriment of Kansas water
43
users and requested a decree of equitable apportionment.
Upon reviewing the findings of the Special Master, the Court
granted Colorado's request for an injunction, 4 4 noting that Kansas had
failed to present sufficient evidence that the increase in upstream appropriations had worked a discernible injury to the rights of Kansas and its
water users. 45 Further, the Court, in dictum, suggested that the negotiation of an allocation agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the
United States Constitution, 46 should be the preferred medium for the
35. Id.
36. Id at 671. During the same term, the Court decided the only other equitable
apportionment case involving contending riparian doctrine states, New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931), modifiedper curiam, 347 U.S. 995 (1954). NewJersey had sought
to enjoin New York from diverting water from the Delaware River Basin to New York City.
The Court again refused to strictly apply the natural flow theory of the riparian doctrine,
noting that different considerations took precedence when the parties to a dispute were
quasi-sovereigns rather than private parties. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 342.
The Court accepted the Special Master's findings in toto and denied the requested injunction. Id at 343-46. For a more complete discussion of New Jersey v. New York, see Carmen, Is There a New Era in the Law of Interstate Waters?, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 25 (1931).
37. 297 U.S. 517 (1936). Washington v. Oregon is discussed in Recent Decisions, 35
MICH. L. REV. 130, 176 (1936).
38. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 518-19.
39. Id at 522-23. This finding had an equitable character because even if the Oregon
diversions had been enjoined very little of the water would have reached Washington due
to the porous nature of the riverbed. Id
40. Id at 522-24, 528-30.
41. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943). The case is discussed in Decisions, 44
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1944).
42. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 387-88.
43. Id at 388-89.
44. Id at 400.
45. Id at 398-400.
46. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The definitive work on interstate compacts is
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clauseof the Constitution-aStudy in InterstateAdjustments,
34 YALE LJ. 685 (1925).

COLORADO v. NEW MEXICO H

19851

settlement of interstate water disputes.4 7
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, 48 the Court decreed three competing prior
appropriation states' rights to waters of the North Platte River.4 9 Generally the Court adopted the Special Master's findings 50 that an equitawas necessary to reduce the over-appropriation of
ble apportionment
51
the river.
In Nebraska, the Court employed the doctrine of prior appropriation
as a general guide in its deliberations, but expressly declared that other
factors deserved thoughtful consideration.5 2 Several practical and equitable considerations also influenced the Court's final decree. Among
these were the avoidance of restraining upstream appropriations when
downstream users would not materially benefit,53 the protection of established economies dependent on existing junior appropriations,54 and
the relative importance and efficiency of various uses. 55 After balancing
the relative priorities, equities, and practical considerations, the Court,
using the Master's specific findings as guideposts, apportioned the "dependable" flow 6of the North Platte among the appropriators of the con5
tending states.
Although each of the equitable apportionment cases focused on one
consideration more heavily than another, all maintained that the doctrine is a flexible analysis of pertinent states laws, exigent economic and

social factors, and the relevant facts of each particular case. 5 7 Both Colorado 158 and Colorado 159 contributed to the potpourri of legal and equitable considerations by suggesting a "conservation ethic" in the former
decision and clarifying the claimant state's burden of proof in the latter.
An appreciation for the rationale and significance of these two developments requires an examination of the facts.
II.
A.

THE ORIGINS OF COLORADO

v.

NEW MEXICO

The Situs of the Controversy

The Vermejo River is a non-navigible stream which originates in
Colorado. 60 The Vermejo's three major tributaries-Little Vermejo
Creek, Ricardo Creek, and the North Fork of the Vermejo--originate on
47. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 392.
48. 325 U.S. 589 (1945), modified per curiam, 345 U.S. 981 (1953). Nebraska v. Wyoming is discussed in Friedrich, supra note 7.
49. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 599-600.
50. Id at 601-07, 620-39, 655.
51. Id at 608-10.
52. Id at 618.
53. Id at 618-19.
54. Id at 618, 621-22.
55. Id. at 656.
56. Id at 621-56, 665-72.
57. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1982).
58. Id at 176. ColoradoI is discussed in Cohen, An Interstate Water Problem Between Missasippi and Alabama-The Escatawm River, 35 ALA. L. REv. 291 (1984).
59. 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984).
60. ColoradoH1, 104 S. Ct. at 2436.
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the eastern slopes of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains in south-central
Colorado. 6 1 Approximately one mile south of the Colorado-New Mexico border, these tributaries combine to form the main stem of the Vermejo River. 6 2 A minor tributary, Fish Creek, joins the Little Vermejo
65
Creek just north of the state line.
The main stem of the Vermejo flows in a southeasterly direction for
approximately fifty-five miles before its confluence with the North Canadian River. 64 There are four major appropriators of water from the
main stem: the Phelps Dodge Corporation, the Kaiser Steel Corporation, the Vermejo Park Corporation, and the Vermejo Conservancy District. 6 5 A Colorado user has never appropriated Vermejo tributary
66
water.
The waters of the Vermejo River have been filly appropriated by
New Mexico users. 6 7 New Mexico appropriators use roughly 11,600
acre-feet annually. 68 The Vermejo Conservancy District is the most sig69
nificant appropriator, using approximately 10,200 acre-feet annually.
Colorado's contribution to this flow ranges between 5,500 and 8,400
70
acre-feet annually.
B.

Early Adjudications

On June 20, 1975, the Colorado Fuel and Iron Steel Corporation
(C.F.&I.) obtained a conditional water right from the Colorado District
Court for Water Division No. 2 to appropriate seventy-five cubic feet of
71
water per second (c.f.s.) from the headwaters of the Vermejo River.
Using a ditch and some 3,000 feet of tunnel, C.F.&I. proposed to divert
forty-five c.f.s. from Ricardo Creek, twenty-five c.f.s. from Little Vermejo
Creek, and five c.f.s. from Fish Creek to a storage reservoir on a small
stream in the adjacent Purgatoire River Basin. 7 2 Because the Purgatoire
River is over-appropriated, the imported water was to be used to meet
present as well as future water requirements by industrial, agricultural,
73
and municipal users.
Almost a year later, the four major New Mexico appropriators petitioned the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
for an injunction to prohibit C.F.&I. from diverting water from the Ver61. Post-Hearing Brief at 3, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (filed by Colorado).
62. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178.
63. Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 61, at 3.
64. Colorado 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2436.
65. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 177.
68. Reply Brief of the State of Colorado at 9, Colorado 1, 459 U.S. 176 (1982). An acrefoot is a volumetric unit of water measurement. One acre-foot is that amount of water
needed to cover one acre of land one foot deep and equals 43,560 cubic feet or 325,900
gallons of water. 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 2.3 (1967).
69. Id.
70. Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 61, at 8.
71. Complaint at 6, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
72. Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 61, at 8.
73. Id at 8, 9, 39.
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mejo's tributaries. 7 4 The state of New Mexico supported the position of
the plaintiffs as amicus curiae. 75 In response to a motion by the plaintiffs for summary judgment, 76 the court held that the doctrine of prior
appropriation determined the litigants' rights and permanently enjoined
the proposed diversion on the basis that the appropriations by New
77
Mexico users were prior in time to C.F.&I.'s conditional water right.
C.F.&I. then filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. 78 The Tenth Circuit subsequently stayed these proceedings, however, following the Supreme Court's grant of Colorado's motion for leave to file an original complaint. 79 Colorado's motion to the
Supreme Court followed an unsuccessful attempt by both states to reach
a negotiated settlement.8 0
C.

Colorado v. New Mexico I

Colorado's Bill of Complaint requested that a decree be entered
equitably apportioning the water of the Vermejo and its tributaries.8 1
After New Mexico filed an answer to the Bill of Complaint and A Motion
to Refer to a Special Master, the Supreme Court appointed the Honorable Ewing T. Kerr, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for
82
the District of Wyoming as Special Master.
The Special Master received an extensive amount of evidence during the course of a sixteen-day trial.8 3 On January 9, 1982, he submitted
to the Court the "Report of the Special Master on the Equitable Apportionment of the Vermejo River."'8 4 The Master advised the Court that
85
most of the river flow was consumed by New Mexico appropriators.
Moreover, the Master found that if the rule of priority was strictly applied, Colorado could not be allowed to divert because the entire flow
was needed to satisfy the senior demands of New Mexico users.8 6 Nevertheless, using the doctrine of equitable apportionment as a basis, the
Master recommended that Colorado be allowed to divert 4,000 acre-feet
87
of water annually from the tributaries of the Vermejo.
This recommendation stemmed from the Master's conclusion that
such a diversion "would not materially affect the appropriations granted
by New Mexico for users downstream." 8 8 Using a balancing analysis of
74. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178.
75. Reply Brief at 15, Colorado 1, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (filed by Colorado).
76. Id
77. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 178-79.
78. Id at 179.
79. Id
80. Complaint, supra note 71, at 7. New Mexico broke off the negotiations.
81. Id at 9.
82. Docket Sheet at 1, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
83. Reply Brief of the State of Colorado, supra note 68, at 1.
84. Colorado 1, 459 U.S. at 180.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Id
88. Report of the Special Master on the Equitable Apportionment of the Vermejo
River at 2-3, Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
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the respective costs and benefits of the diversion to the two states,8 9 the
Master determined the diversion's relative effect. The Master also noted
that the recommended allocation would impair the water rights of only
one New Mexico user, the Vermejo Conservancy District, and characterized that appropriator's system of water distribution as wasteful and
inefficient. 90
New Mexico filed objections to the Master's recommendation, contending that, in the absence of an established economy in Colorado dependent upon the waters of the Vermejo, the rule of priority controlled
because both states followed the doctrine of prior appropriation. 9 1 As
92
the river had been previously fully appropriated by New Mexico users,
strict application of this rule would necessarily preclude any proposed
diversions.93
On December 13, 1982, the Court, in a majority opinion by justice
Marshall, rejected New Mexico's contention that the rule of priority was
controlling and reiterated its long-held view that, although the water
laws of the contending states are an important consideration in the equitable apportionment analysis, they are but guiding principles in the allocation of interstate waters. 9 4 The Court then adopted what has been
described as a "conservation ethic" 9 5 as a relevant consideration in the
equitable apportionment analysis. 96 The Court concluded that the Special Master's consideration of existing uses and their relative efficiency
compared to the potential benefits and efficiency of uses associated with
the proposed diversion was entirely appropriate. 9 7 The Court found,
however, that the factual findings were insufficient to support a decree
of equitable apportionment.9" Therefore, the Court remanded the case
to the Special Master for specific factual findings as to the potential for
eliminating wasteful water use practices through reasonable conservation measures and the precise character of the proposed uses and accompanying benefits to Colorado from the proposed diversion. 9 9
In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Stevens, stated that the dominant consideration in the equitable apportionment analysis was the equality of rights of the contending states
to the benefits of interstates waters.' 0 0 While mentioning that inefficiency of current uses and prior dependence on existing appropriations
were relevant factors, Chief justice Burger did not mention state water
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id at 7-8, 23.
Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 181-82, 184.
Id at 177.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Id. at 183-84.
95. Shiffbauer, The Conservation Ethic in the Adjudication of Interstate Water Disputes by the
U.S. Supreme Court: Colorado v. New Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES L. NEWSLETTER 7 (1983).
96. Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 185.
97. Id at 184, 186, 188, 190.
98. Id at 183.
99. Id at 190.
100. Id at 191 (Burger, C.J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring).
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laws as being an appropriate consideration in the determination of ajust
apportionment. t01
While also concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Powell, distanced themselves from the other justices by strongly
10 2
counseling judicial restraint in equitable apportionment actions.
Fearing that the Court may be inviting more original jurisdiction actions
if it freely engaged in a balancing of relative harms, benefits, and efficiencies of interstate water uses, Justice O'Connor urged that the Court
abstain from regulating the water usage of one state absent a showing by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the usage is "unreasonably
03
wasteful."'
Despite the difficulty of pointing to a trend in the Court's thinking,
especially because the case law essentially turns on a balancing of equities, 104 one commentator has argued that the introduction of a "conservation ethic" as a substantive criterion into the equitable apportionment
analysis suggests a willingness by the Court to measure the security of a
water right by the efficiency of use, rather than by the date of appropriation. 10 5 The significance of a "conservation ethic" in the equitable apportionment analysis remains, however, uncertain because the Court in
Colorado I did not elaborate upon its earlier consideration of this new
element of the equitable apportionment analysis.
III.

COLORADO v. NEw MEXICO II

On remand, the Special Master denied a motion by New Mexico to
submit new evidence. 10 6 After advancing additional factual findings
based on the previously established record,' 0 7 the Master reaffirmed his
original recommendation.10 8 New Mexico filed its exceptions to the
Master's second report'0 9 and the case was argued to the Court onJanuary 9, 1984.110
A.

The Majority Opinion

Writing for an eight-member majority, Justice O'Connor sustained
New Mexico's exceptions to the report and its additional factual findings
and dismissed the case."' The majority's rejection of the Master's factual findings and conclusions of law marks the first time in the history of
equitable apportionment cases involving interstate waters that the Court
101. Id
102. Id at 195 (O'Connor, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
103. Id
104. See Grant, The Future of InterstateAllocation of Water, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
977, 986-87 (1983).
105. Schiffbauer, supra note 95, at 8.
106. Colorado /, 104 S. Ct. at 2437-38.
107. Additional Factual Findings at 2-28, Colorado H, 104 S. Ct. 2433 (1984).
108. Id at 29.
109. Colorado /, 104 S. Ct. at 2436.
110. Docket Sheet, supra note 82, at 3.
111. Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2434.
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2
has completely rejected the recommendations of a Special Master.'"
After reviewing the facts of the case and the Court's decision in Colorado 1, l lSJustice O'Connor proceeded to distinguish the Court's analysis in Colorado I from that in Colorado 11.114 Justice O'Connor stated that
the former ruling essentially addressed the question of the relevancy of
various factors in the determination of "a just apportionment." ' 15 The
present inquiry, Justice O'Connor maintained, dealt instead with the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the recommendation of a decree
16
of equitable apportionment.

Justice O'Connor stated that the appropriate standard of proof in
an equitable apportionment action is the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, noting that the Court had explicitly informed Colorado of its applicability in Colorado 1.117 The Court had justified this
higher standard of proof for three reasons: first, to protect established
uses from the risks of an erroneous decision; second, to maintain property rights; and third, as an assurance that resources will be put to "their
most efficient uses." 1 18 Thus, the majority concluded that Colorado
would not be granted an equitable apportionment decree unless it could
show that the benefits from the proposed diversion or the inefficiencies
of the present uses were "highly probable." ' 19
In turning to the evidence, Justice O'Connor noted that New Mexico had met its initial burden of proof in Colorado I by showing that there
existed a threat of a "real or substantial injury."' 120 The majority then
12 1
assessed the sufficiency of Colorado's evidence and found it lacking.
This assessment differed sharply from that of the Master, who had concluded that Colorado had convincingly made its case. 122
While acknowledging that "the Master's findings . . . deserve respect and a tacit presumption of correctness," ' 2 3 Justice O'Connor nevertheless disagreed with several of the Master's findings. 124 The
majority found that Colorado's evidence was not specific enough in
identifying either "financially and physically feasible" conservation
measures to correct existing inefficiencies in water usage' 2 5 or the fu12 6
ture benefits and efficiencies associated with the proposed diversion.
After reaffirming the Court's holding in Colorado I that the water's
point of origin was an improper consideration in the equitable appor112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See supra note 3.
Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2436-38.
Id at 2438.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2439-41.
Additional Factual Findings, supra note 107, at 28.
Colorado H1, 104 S. Ct. at 2439.
Id at 2439-42.
Id. at 2439-41.
Id. at 2441.
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tionment analysis, 127 Justice O'Connor concluded that the equitites
compelled the protection of existing uses and, thus, a denial of Colorado's request.' 28 The majority, however, made it clear that the Court
believed that the doctrine of equitable apportionment was flexible
enough to recognize state claims to appropriated water for highly prob129
able future beneficial uses.
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

In an incisive and well-reasoned dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for its "cursory" examination of the evidence and
complete rejection of the Master's findings.' 3 0 After noting that the
Master had applied the Court's "clear and convincing evidence" standard to the proof presented, Justice Stevens raised the question of
whether the majority applied the proper standard when it reviewed the
Master's factual findings. '3 ' Justice Stevens also faulted the majority for
reviewing not the evidence, but rather the factual determinations of the
Master.13 2 The dissent asserted that a substantial degree ofjudicial deference to the findings of a Master is appropriate in equitable apportionment actions because the record is "typically lengthy, technical, and
33
complex."'
After an extensive comparison of the evidence to the factual findings of the Master,' 3 4 Justice Stevens concluded that the Master's recommendation was wholly supported by the record.' s 5 By using excerpts
from the testimony he indicated that there was ample evidence to support each of the Master's findings;' 3 6 in particular, that reasonable conservation measures by New Mexico appropriators would ameliorate any
37
possible injury stemming from the proposed diversion.'

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Court's decision in Colorado II portends the end of interstate
water rights litigation in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Court has definitively outlined the onerousness of the claimant's
burden of proof in equitable apportionment actions1 38 and only time
will tell whether any state is willing or able to shoulder such an evidentiary burden.
Although the Court's reluctance to hear original jurisdiction cases is
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 2442.
Id
Id at 2438, 2442.
Id at 2443 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id
Id
Id
Id at 2444-50.
Id at 2450.
Id at 2445-49.
Id at 2450.
Colorado11, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-41.
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understandable given its crowded docket and the exceptional procedural demands which equitable apportionment actions impose,' 3 9 the
Court's use of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard as a shield
from such litigation is unjustifiable where the crux of the dispute is the
allocation of interstate waters. The following two arguments demonstrate the impropriety of the majority opinion.
A.

Complete Disregardfor the Special Master's Findings Seriously Undermines
the Established Practice of Referral in Equitable Apportionment Cases

As noted earlier, the Court in Colorado II broke with tradition by
completely rejecting the findings of the Court-appointed Special
Master. 140 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, it is unclear whether
the majority actually reviewed the evidence in the record during its deliberations. ' 41 Moreover, there is not a single direct reference by Justice
O'Connor to evidence in the record supporting the majority's conclusions concerning the correctness of the Master's findings.
Implicit in the dissent is the criticism that the majority misapplied
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard by using it to test the sufficiency of the findings the Master used to support his recommendation,
rather than using that standard to test the sufficiency of Colorado's evidence. 142 The Court's wisdom in totally rejecting the factual determinations made by an experienced trial judge' 43 on the basis of sixteen full
days of trial is questionable, especially when the majority had no opportunity to assess the witnesses' demeanor and credibility.
What is most troublesome, however, about the Court's complete
rejection of the Master's findings is that it seriously undermines the efficacy and credibility of the referral process. Because Special Masters
have acted in the past as the eyes and ears of the Court, their factual
determinations have been afforded substantial deference. 144 The Court
chose, however, to ignore the distinct advantage of the Master's proximity to the litigants and the evidence, relying instead on its own conclusions as to the sufficiency of the Master's findings. By focusing its review
14 5
on the Master's findings rather than on the evidence in the record,
the Court has subtly shifted the crux of interstate water rights litigation
from the presentation of evidence before a Special Master to the presentation of exceptions to the Master's findings.' 4 6 Thus, it would appear
that in order for a state to obtain a favorable judgment, it no longer
must prevail at trial on the basis of its proffered evidence. The Court's
decision offers a state a second opportunity to win. The majority opin139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See 2 C. CORKER, WATERS AND WATER Rxirs §§ 132.1, 132.8 (1967).
See supra note 3.
Colorado H1, 104 S. Ct. at 2443 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id
Judge Kerr represented Wyoming in Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940),

as Attorney General of the state of Wyoming.
144. See supra note 3.

145. Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-41.
146. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 623-54.
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ion indicates that if a state can show that the Master's findings, for reasons of imprecision, lack of clarity, or poor presentation, do not
persuasively support his recommendation, then that state will prevail,
regardless of the evidence in the record supporting the Master's ultimate conclusion.
In light of the equitable attributes of original actions involving interstate water disputes, it hardly seems just that a state which has by
clear and convincing evidence persuaded a Special Master of the exigency of equitable relief should be denied such relief because the Court
finds that the Master's factual findings do not clearly and convincingly
support his recommendation. Faced with the prospect of such an inequitable outcome, the wiser course of action for a claimant state is to oppose the appointment of a Special Master, rather than acquiesce to his
traditional appointment by the Court. 14 7 Thus, the ultimate effect of
the Court's decision may be to discourage the use of Special Masters in
future equitable apportionment actions.
B.

Public Policy Considerations do not Support the Use of the "Clear and
Convincing Evidence" Standard in Equitable Apportionment Actions
Involving Interstate Water Disputes Between PriorAppropriation
Doctrine States

Although the Court repeatedly stated that Colorado's evidence was
insufficient to show that New Mexico's water usage was wasteful or that
the benefits associated with the diversion would outweigh any potential
harm to existing users, 14 8 the Court neglected to suggest the degree of
specificity Colorado must attain before relief will be forthcoming. Must
Colorado prepare a detailed water conservation plan for the entire Vermejo River Basin? Is Colorado obliged to devise an elaborate scheme to
improve the arguably lax administration of water rights in New Mexico? 14 9 Furthermore, how much planning and development for future
water usage is Colorado required to undertake in order to prove to the
Court the validity of its intentions?
Although the Court curtly acknowledged that there exist "inherent
limitations [in] proving a beneficial future use' 150 and that "[i]t may be
impracticable to ask the State proposing the diversion to provide unerring proof of future uses and concomitant conservation measures that
could be taken," 151 the Court failed to appreciate just how daunting its
evidentiary burden of proof may be for a claimant state. Suffice it to say,
147. By this course of action, the state could, perhaps, gain the opportunity to present
its full case to the Court and thus avoid the possibility of losing its case due to some
perceived inadequacy in the findings of a Special Master. Although it is admittedly unlikely that the Court would agree to hear any case de novo, support for such a procedure
may be implied from the writings of the Founding Fathers. See, e.g., A. HAMILTON, THE
FEDERALIsT No. 80 (McLean ed. 1901).
148. Colorado 11, 104 S. Ct. at 2438-41.
149. Id at 2446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Colorado II, 104 S. Ct. at 2442.
151. Id. at 2440.
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the total cost of the detailed water use studies and the requisite conservation measures envisioned by the Court could substantially impair the
overall cost-effectiveness of a proposed diversion project.
Although the reluctance of the Court to entertain equitable apportionment actions involving interstate waters may be understandable in
light of the peculiar demands that they impose upon the Court, 152 the
Court's original jurisdiction in controversies between states requires liberal exercise. The founding fathers granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction specifically so that interstate disputes might be settled without "the partiality, or suspicion of partiality, which might exist if the
plaintiff State were compelled to resort to the courts of the State of
which the defendants were citizens.' t5 3 The Constitution's article III
grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over suits between
the states is traceable to the frustrations the founding fathers encountered in the settlement of interstate disputes under the Articles of
54
Confederation. '
The inability of these Articles of Confederation to competently resolve disputes between the member states led to the drafting and incorporation of article III into the federal Constitution.' 5 5 Writing in
support of the need for a supreme national tribunal with original jurisdiction in suits between two states, Alexander Hamilton argued that
"[w]hatever practices may have a tendency to disturb the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal supervision and control."' 5 6 Hamilton's reasoning is still appropriate because exercise of
152. See supra note 139.
153. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888).
154. See 4 JouRN. OF CONGRESS 283 (Congressional resolution urging a peaceful settlement of the conflicting territorial claims by Connecticut and Pennsylvania to lands in the
Wyoming and Susquehannah River Valleys); 15 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 1411 ("Whereas it
appears to Congress, from the presentation of the delegates of the State of Pennsylvania,
that disputes have arisen between the states of Pennsylvania and Virginia, relative to the
extent of their boundaries, which may probably be productive of serious evils to both
states"); 18 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 832-33 (Congressional recognition of boundary dispute
between New Hampshire and New York); 18 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 1147-48 (report to the
Continental Congress on the territorial dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania
over lands in the Wyoming River Valley); 21 JOURN. OF CONGRESS 1115-16 ("a controversy
has long subsisted between the said State of Pennsylvania and the State of Connecticut,
respecting sundry lands lying within the northern boundary of the State of Pennsylvania").
155. SeeJ. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUrON OF THE UNITED STATES 543-45
(Boston 1833). See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1791), where Chief
Justice Jay noted that:
[p]rior to the date, of the constitution, the people had not any national tribunal,
to which they could resort for justice; the distribution ofjustice was then confined
to state judicatories, in whose institution and organization the people of other
states had no participation, and over whom they had not the least control. There
was then no general court of appellate jurisdiction, by whom the errors of state
courts, affecting either the nation at large, or the citizens of any other state, could
be revised and corrected. Each state was obliged to acquiesce in the measure of
justice, which another state might yield to her, or her citizens; and that, even in
cases where state considerations were not always favourable to the most exact
measure. There was danger, that from this source animosities would in time result; and as the transition from animosities to hostilities was frequent in the history of independent states, a common tribunal for the termination of
controversies became desirable, from motives both of justice and policy.
156. A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 114 (McLean ed. 1901).
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the doctrine of equitable apportionment displaces the efficacy of state
water laws and administrative procedures that frustrate legitimate efforts
by sister states and out-of-state water users to appropriate interstate waters. 157 If the Court is to respect the rationale underlying its original
jurisdiction in actions between the states, it ought to recognize that
there will be occasions when the Court must act as a constitutionallydenominated water rights administrator in order to insure that jealous
protection by states of interstate waters within their borders does not
unjustly discriminate against neighboring states.
Although the Court in the past has suggested that interstate water
disputes are best settled through the negotiation of interstate compacts, 158 states seeking an equitable apportionment have found the
Court willing, albeit not eager, to hear such actions. It is crucial that the
Court continue to be receptive to requests for equitable apportionment
decrees when negotiations between contending states have failed, especially because Congress' 5 9 has been reluctant to impinge upon state
sovereignty by statutorily apportioning interstate waters. 160 Yet, the
Court in Colorado II has elevated the claimant state's search for an equitable apportionment to a truly Herculean undertaking by placing the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard in its path.
Although all of the equitable apportionment cases have applied the
"clear and convincing evidence" standard, the salutariness of its application to equitable apportionment actions involving prior appropriation
states is questionable. The original purpose in requiring the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard was to insure that states could not easily
force a change in another state's conduct by way of an original jurisdiction action based on a complaint alleging the pollution of interstate waters. 1 6 '
Thus, if beneficial use is truly the touchstone of an
157. See Note, The OriginalJurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV.
665, 682-83 (1959).
158. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963).
159. The notable exception to this reluctance is the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43
U.S.C. § 617 (1976).
160. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 597 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
161. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-21 (1906). It should be noted that while
Justice Holmes is credited with setting out the "clear and convincing evidence" standard,
he cites the opinion of ChiefJustice Fuller in Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) as
supportive of his formulation of a burden of proof standard for suits between states. A
close reading of Kansas v. Colorado, however, does not reveal any language that either
explicitly or implicitly supportsJustice Holmes' "clear and convincing evidence" standard.
In Kansas v. Colorado, Chief Justice Fuller did no more than advise Kansas that "proof
should be made as to whether Colorado is herself actually threatening to wholly exhaust
the flow of the Arkansas River." Id. at 147.
Even if the "clear and convincing evidence" standard has a laudable function in nuisance actions between states over the pollution of interstate waters, whatever worth it possesses stems primarily from the draconian character of the type of remedy that has been
sought in these cases, namely an injunction. Because equitable apportionment does not
usually require the exercise of injunctions against existing uses but rather an accommodation among existing users, the partial diminution of existing water rights, or the prohibition of future uses, the Court should not demand the same burden of proof from states
seeking the equitable apportionment of interstate waters as it might require from states
seeking to enjoin all alleged nuisance activities in an interstate waters pollution case.
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appropriative water right,' 62 then that end rather than the protection of
existing uses should be the Court's principal concern. Moreover, because the doctrine of equitable apportionment is not controlled by the
water law of the contending states,' 63 the Court may objectively assess
the beneficial effects of existing and proposed water uses and the extent
to which existing water rights are being beneficially applied, removed
from the potentially prejudicial influence of partisan state statutes and
rules. Therefore, if the Court is to adhere to the doctrine of equitable
apportionment, the Court should not hold a prior appropriation state to
the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, but rather to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, because concern for the maintenance of the "status quo between the States"'' 64 should give way to the
paramount concern for the beneficial use of a scarce resource.
CONCLUSION

Although judicial restraint may often be a laudable judicial princi-

ple, its value is questionable in instances of interstate water rights litigation following fruitless compact negotiations. When a state has been
unsuccessful in reaching an accord with a contending state whose negotiating position is superior because of existing appropriations, there
should exist a meaningful opportunity to obtain equitable relief through
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
By elevating the protection of existing uses and thereby subordinating the equality of the rights of states to the beneficial use of interstate
waters, the Court's decision in Colorado II seriously endangers the efficacy of the original action as a means of obtaining equitable settlements
of interstate water rights disputes. Given the rarity of equitable apportionment actions involving interstate waters, it may, however, be many
years before it is known whether Colorado II sounded the death knell for
interstate water rights litigation in the original jurisdiction of the Court.
Peter A. Fahmy
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